Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions by Mayer, Lloyd Hitoshi
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2014 
Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions 
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Mayer, Lloyd Hitoshi, "Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions" (2014). Connecticut Law 
Review. 236. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/236 
 1045 
CONNECTICUT 
LAW REVIEW 
 
VOLUME 46 FEBRUARY 2014 NUMBER 3 
 
Article 
Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions 
LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER 
This Article proposes a new constitutional framework for approaching 
the issue of speech-related conditions on government funding accepted by 
nonprofits and demonstrates its application by reviewing the Court’s 
landmark decisions in this area.  It argues that speech rights are generally 
inalienable as against the government under the First Amendment, and 
therefore any abridgement of such rights by the government—whether 
direct or indirect—is subject to strict scrutiny.  As a result, the government 
is not permitted to buy an organization’s speech absent a compelling 
governmental interest in doing so and then only if the purchase is done in a 
manner that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 
This Article’s approach contrasts with the current approach of the 
Supreme Court in this area, which in its various attempts to resolve 
disputes centering on such conditions has left courts, governments, and 
private parties understandably confused about the applicable 
constitutional standards.  This tendency is illustrated in particular by the 
Court’s recent Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open 
Society International opinion.  This framework also has two broader 
ramifications.  First, it may prove useful for resolving constitutional 
disputes relating to other speech-related conditions, such as campaign 
finance limits tied to government funding or other government benefits.  
Second, it demonstrates that by drawing on the extensive unconstitutional 
conditions literature to create an approach customized to a particular 
constitutional context it may be possible to salvage the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine even given its widely acknowledged incoherence.  
Salvaging the doctrine is particularly important in a world where 
government benefits both permeate almost every type of activity and are 
often accompanied by constitutionally suspect restrictions. 
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Nonprofits, Speech, and Unconstitutional Conditions 
LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
If there is any consensus with respect to the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions, it is that the doctrine is a mess both generally 
and in the specific constitutional contexts in which the courts have applied 
it.1  While some of the most prominent legal scholars have attempted to 
bring coherence to the doctrine,2 others have concluded that coherence is 
unachievable.3  Yet, at the same time, the Supreme Court and the lower 
federal courts continue to apply the doctrine to a wide variety of 
circumstances.4 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor and Associate Dean, Notre Dame Law School.  I am very grateful to Ellen Aprill, 
Amy Barrett, Miriam Galston, Rick Garnett, and Randy Kozel for comments and to Joseph Ganahl, 
Daniel Herbster, and Holly LaCount for research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1995) (“[The] larger 
portions of the area . . . cannot be theoretically rationalized.”); Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial 
Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the 
Lesser,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 693, 763 (2002) (“Existing commercial speech doctrine is a mess.”); Daniel 
A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 913, 951 (2006) (“A clear view of the unconstitutional conditions quagmire reveals a 
messy scene . . . .”). 
2 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in 
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (2001) (attempting to effectuate a compromise with regards to 
unconstitutional conditions); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court—1987 Term: Foreword, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1988) 
(showing the functionality of unconstitutional conditions in various contexts); Farber, supra note 1, at 
915 (clarifying the problem of unconstitutional conditions by viewing constitutional rights like a 
contract default); Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A 
Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 380 (1995) (articulating a more easily applicable 
conception of the doctrine); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413, 1506 (1989) (providing a better depiction of the doctrine). 
3 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of 
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (“[T]he problem of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is . . . an intractable problem.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional 
Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 
70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 608 (1990) (arguing for the abandonment of the doctrine because of its 
ineffectiveness). 
4 See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595–97 (2013) 
(applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a state’s decision to deny a permit based on a 
private party’s refusal to turn over property to the government); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for 
Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328–30 (2013) (applying the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine to a speech-related condition on federal funding); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 
S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012) (applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the withholding of all 
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This Article is not another attempt to bring clarity to the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine across the entire constitutional 
landscape.5  It instead has the more modest but also more achievable goal 
of bringing clarity to a particular place within that landscape on which the 
Supreme Court has focused repeatedly, most recently this past term in 
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society 
International (“Alliance”).6  That place is speech-related conditions on 
government-provided benefits to nonprofit organizations. 
There are several reasons to focus on this particular part of the legal 
terrain.  First, this area has and is likely to continue to see significant 
conflict.  Nonprofits both tend to seek government benefits and desire to 
speak freely about controversial issues, as illustrated by a series of disputes 
that have reached the Supreme Court.7  Second, how the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine applies to such conflicts remains highly uncertain.  For 
example, in Alliance, the nonprofits prevailed at the appellate court level, 
but the judges split two-to-one, with both sides claiming that their position 
was clearly correct based on existing unconstitutional conditions 
precedent.8  While such claims are in part a rhetorical device, the fact that 
both sides could plausibly make them illustrates the current confusion 
regarding the doctrine’s application in this context.  While the Supreme 
Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision by a vote of six to two 
(Justice Kagan recused, presumably because she had been involved with 
the case as Solicitor General),9 for reasons that will be detailed in this 
Article, the majority’s reasoning did little to help clarify the constitutional 
standards in this area.  In fact, the majority’s subtle recharacterization of 
the Court’s previous decisions likely has actually created more uncertainty. 
                                                                                                                          
federal Medicaid funding if a state did not agree to accept expanded Medicaid coverage and related 
conditions). 
5 The breadth of the landscape can be seen in the many contexts in which the federal courts have 
applied the doctrine.  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 4 (listing applications of the doctrine ranging 
from state incorporation powers to public roads to employment cases to tax exemptions); Jason 
Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 807 (2003) (listing a multitude of conditions 
that the Supreme Court has found to be unconstitutional). 
6 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). 
7 Besides the most recent case, the Supreme Court also squarely addressed this issue in Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (abortion), FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) 
(noncommercial, educational broadcasting), and Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 
461 U.S. 540 (1983) (federal taxation). 
8 See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 234 (2d Cir. 
2011) (“[W]e conclude that the Policy Requirement, as implemented by the Agencies, falls well beyond 
what the Supreme Court and this Court have upheld as permissible funding conditions.” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 240 (Straub, J., dissenting) (“On the contrary, the Policy Requirement, together with the 
Guidelines implemented by Defendants, is precisely in line with the ‘unconstitutional conditions’ 
doctrine as it has been applied in the context of subsidy conditions alleged to violate the First 
Amendment.” (emphasis added)). 
9 Alliance,133 S. Ct. at 2321. 
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Third, the approach developed in this limited area may have 
application to other, related disputes, such as challenges to conditions 
limiting the election-related speech of for-profit corporations receiving 
certain government benefits (a particularly contentious area in the wake of 
Citizens United).10  That possibility in turn suggests a different way to 
approach the unconstitutional conditions doctrine more generally.  Rather 
than attempting to develop a universal theory or approach for the doctrine, 
it may be more productive to instead develop a specific framework for 
applying the doctrine in a given constitutional context and then to extend 
that framework only to other, related disputes on an incremental basis.  
Given the pervasiveness of government benefits and therefore the risk to 
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms if there is not a robust 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it is critical that a way be found to 
salvage the doctrine whenever possible.11 
Part II focuses on the issue of speech-related conditions on 
government-provided benefits to nonprofit organizations, developing a 
new framework for applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in 
this particular First Amendment context.  This framework is based on the 
conclusion that speech rights are generally inalienable as against the 
government under the First Amendment, and therefore any abridgement of 
such rights by the government—whether direct or indirect—is subject to 
strict scrutiny.  As a result, the government is not permitted to buy an 
organization’s speech absent a compelling governmental interest in doing 
so and then only if the purchase is done in a manner that is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest. 
Part III contrasts this framework with the shifting approaches taken by 
the Supreme Court in resolving three unconditional conditions disputes in 
this area, including Alliance.  Part IV then considers broader ramifications 
of this approach, including the framework’s possible application to speech-
related conditions on benefits received by for-profit entities, such as 
restrictions on election-related speech by government contractors, and 
whether this customized and incremental approach to developing the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine might provide a better way of 
clarifying the doctrine in other contexts. 
II.  RETHINKING SPEECH AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
The vast majority of nonprofits depend significantly on government 
benefits in a variety of forms.  Besides the well-known benefits of 
                                                                                                                          
10 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
11 See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1419 (“[The] unconstitutional conditions doctrine performs an 
important function.  It identifies a characteristic technique by which government appears not to, but in 
fact does burden . . . liberties . . . .”). 
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exemption from federal income tax and the ability to receive tax deductible 
contributions, nonprofits, especially charitable, educational, religious, and 
similar organizations, enjoy a host of other government-provided 
benefits.12  In addition, many nonprofits receive substantial government 
financial support in the form of grants, contracts, and payments to benefit 
individuals, such as through the Medicare and Medicaid systems.13  Not 
surprisingly, these benefits often come with numerous strings attached, 
including speech-related conditions.14 
At the same time, many nonprofits consider it a fundamental part of 
their mission to communicate certain values, messages, or public policy 
positions to others.  Such communications can and often have run afoul of 
the speech-related conditions on the government benefits they enjoy.  The 
recent Alliance case illustrates this conflict.  At issue in that case was a 
provision of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (“the Act”) that barred funding 
under the Act for any group or organization “that does not have a policy 
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”15  To enforce this 
prohibition, the implementing agencies required the recipients of funding 
under the Act to document their opposition to prostitution and sex 
trafficking.16  The agencies also established guidelines requiring sufficient 
separation from any affiliated entities that did not comply with this 
requirement, with the sufficiency of such separation determined by not 
only the extent of legal and financial separation but also the extent to 
which the organizations maintained separate personnel and physical 
facilities.17  While the affected nonprofits could have chosen either to 
refuse the funding or accept the speech-related condition, they chose a 
third option: to challenge the condition as unconstitutional.  This Part 
develops a new framework for resolving such disputes that is on more solid 
constitutional footing than the various approaches the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                          
12 See Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28 
U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 85–86 (1993) (summarizing benefits charities receive from federal, state, and local 
governments); Memorandum from Erika Lunder, Legislative Att’y, Cong. Research Serv., to Joint 
Comm. on Taxation (Feb. 16, 2005) (summarizing statutes of the federal government and five states 
that confer legal benefits on to charities). 
13 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-193, NONPROFIT SECTOR: 
SIGNIFICANT FEDERAL FUNDS REACH THE SECTOR THROUGH VARIOUS MECHANISMS, BUT MORE 
COMPLETE AND RELIABLE FUNDING DATA ARE NEEDED (2009) (describing and attempting to quantify 
the flow of federal funds to nonprofit organizations). 
14 See Steven Rathgeb Smith, Government Financing of Nonprofit Activity, in NONPROFITS & 
GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION & CONFLICT 219, 234–36 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle 
eds., 2d ed. 2006) (describing strings that may be attached to the government benefits received by non-
profits).  
15 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (2013) 
(quoting 22 U.S.C. § 763(f) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 Id. at 2326. 
17 Id. at 2326–27. 
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taken to date. 
A.  The Inalienability of the Constitutional Right to Free Speech 
Kathleen Sullivan’s landmark article provides perhaps the most quoted 
definition of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which states that the 
doctrine “reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do 
indirectly what it may not do directly.”18  More specifically, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is implicated in the following situation:  “[The 
g]overnment offers a benefit that it is constitutionally permitted but not 
compelled to offer, on condition that the recipient undertake (or refrain 
from) future action that is legal for him to undertake (or to refrain from) 
but that government could not have constitutionally compelled (or 
prohibited) without especially strong justification.”19  That is, the doctrine 
applies when the government provides a constitutionally permitted but 
optional benefit conditioned on the recipient giving up a constitutionally 
protected right.20  Of course, it may not always be clear whether a given 
benefit is optional or whether a given condition actually infringes on a 
constitutionally protected right.  Fortunately, in the context of allegedly 
speech-related conditions on government funding, it is usually clear 
whether the benefit is optional on the part of the government and also 
whether the condition is in fact speech-related.21  For purposes of this 
Article, it will, therefore, be assumed that it can be readily determined 
whether these threshold conditions for application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine exist.  
Even if the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is implicated, that does 
not automatically mean the condition is in fact unconstitutional.  Whether 
the condition at issue is unconstitutional is the key question that the 
doctrine attempts to answer, but often with limited success for several 
reasons.  A threshold problem is determining the extent to which 
constitutional rights generally, or certain constitutional rights specifically, 
are alienable with respect to the governmentthat is, can be traded with 
the government by the individual or entity enjoying them.22  The role of the 
                                                                                                                          
18 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1415. 
19 Id. at 1427. 
20 See Epstein, supra note 2, at 7 (“The problem of unconstitutional conditions arises whenever a 
government seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining bargained-for consent of the party whose 
conduct is to be restricted.”). 
21 For an example of a situation where the Supreme Court found an allegedly speech-related 
condition that did not implicate the First Amendment, see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65, 66, 69–70 (2006). 
22 See Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, Rights for Sale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 90, 92 (2011) (indicating 
the idea for a “detailed framework of . . . intermediate alienability techniques” and the “modularity of 
alienability”); Farber, supra note 1, at 914 (“Despite the Declaration of Independence’s proclamation of 
inalienable rights, constitutional rights are indeed alienable in the sense that they can be waived in 
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government as the other party is important, because usually part of having 
a right is the ability to choose how to exercise that right, including 
exercising the right in a way that another party who has paid the holder of 
the right directs or even foregoing to exercise the right at all in exchange 
for some type of consideration.23  Simply because a right holder should 
generally be able to bargain away that right does not mean, however, that 
she should be permitted to do so when the other party is the government.24  
This limitation is of particular concern because constitutional rights for 
individuals are generally designed not to limit the dealings of private 
parties, including with respect to influencing others to exercise a right in a 
certain way or not to exercise a right at all, but instead to limit the actions 
of government.25  Alienability, therefore, gets to the key issue of whether 
government can do indirectly what it cannot do directly. 
That said, clearly some rights are currently tradable even with the 
government.  For example, a criminal defendant can trade (although 
generally subject to court approval) her Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial in exchange for a plea bargain that guarantees conviction only for a 
lesser crime or provides for a lighter sentence than might otherwise apply 
if the defendant was convicted as a result of such a trial, although this 
practice is not exempt from criticism.26  Indeed, for some rights the 
                                                                                                                          
return for various benefits.” (footnote omitted)); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1663, 1701 (2007) (“Waivability of constitutional protections is the constitutional 
default . . . .”); Mazzone, supra note 5, at 801–02 (discussing unconstitutional conditions and the 
alienability of constitutional rights in relation to criminal proceedings).  
23 See William T. Mayton, “Buying-Up Speech”: Active Government and the Terms of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 373, 380 (1994) (stating that in general “a 
right is customarily justified by principles of personal autonomy and dignity” and “[a]n implication of 
this autonomy in rights is that they are alienable”); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1486 (noting that making 
constitutional rights inalienable effectively creates duties). 
24 See Epstein, supra note 2, at 22 (stating that in some areas up for bargaining, the government 
has a permanent monopoly and it must be neutralized to constrain the government and give citizens a 
more level playing field); Steven G. Gey, Contracting Away Rights: A Comment on Daniel Farber’s 
“Another View of the Quagmire,” 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 953, 954 (noting the idea that an individual 
can bargain his or her rights away “misconstrues the structural nature of constitutional rights in our 
system of limited government”). 
25 See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. 
L. REV. 479, 484 (2012) (noting that constitutional rights “are framed as limits on government”); 
T. Hunter Jefferson, Note, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles: The Case for the 
Recognition of State Constitutional Tort Actions Against State Governments, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 
1559 (1997) (“[C]onstitutional rights are specifically designed to limit the actions of the government 
and its agents.”). 
26 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea could not be 
rejected as coercive just because the defendant received a benefit in exchange for waiving his right to 
trial); Ana Maria Gutierrez, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of Plea Bargaining in Contemporary 
Criminal Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 696–97, 706 (2010) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment 
rights and the process of waiving those rights are not clear, leading to confusion during the plea bargain 
process); Tina Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional Conditions 
Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 33, 34 (2007) 
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Constitution explicitly provides for such possible trades.  For example, the 
Third Amendment permits the quartering of soldiers in a house in time of 
peace with “the consent of the owner,”27 strongly implying that the 
government could buy this consent.28  At the same time, some rights may 
not be tradable to the government because the government is never 
permitted, under the Constitution, to engage in the activity at issue.  An 
example of this situation may be the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishment even if a criminal agrees to it.29 
As a threshold matter, whether an institution, as opposed to an 
individual, has a right to free speech under the Constitution is itself a 
controversial issue in at least some contexts.30  One need not accept the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United that the source of speech is 
irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the speech itself is 
protected by the First Amendment, however.31  Especially for nonprofit 
organizations engaged in advocacy activities, there is a very strong 
argument that even if First Amendment speech protection is limited to 
individuals, such organizations should also enjoy this protection because 
their speech reflects the speech-related desires of the individuals affiliated 
                                                                                                                          
(stating that in plea bargain situations, the “state is essentially penalizing those defendants who choose 
to exercise their constitutional rights”). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
28 The Third Amendment is rarely invoked in present day litigation, although parties in a recent 
federal lawsuit raised it as part of a claim arising from the police arresting a family after the family 
refused to let officers use their homes as a lookout post for a domestic violence investigation.  Megan 
Gallegos, Police Commandeer Homes, Get Sued, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 3, 2013),  
https://www.courthousenews.com/2013/07/03/59061.htm; see also Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. 
Stroup, Quartering Species: The “Living Constitution,” the Third Amendment, and the Endangered 
Species Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769, 798–99, 804 (2000) (suggesting that the Third Amendment could be 
applied to the quartering of endangered species and that the government would need to purchase or 
compensate the owner for quartering the endangered animals); Geoffrey M. Wyatt, The Third 
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Military Recruiting on Private Campuses, 40 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 113, 158 (2005) (“The [Third] [A]mendment requires consent expressly, and therefore it is a 
dubious proposition that the government may presume consent simply because someone accepts 
‘gratuitous’ federal benefits.”); James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic 
Disasters, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 747, 759–63, 774 (2008) (arguing that violations of the Third 
Amendment occur today without people knowing their rights or that consent is needed). 
29 See Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on Lawyers’ Ethics and Death Row Volunteers, 
77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 806–08 (2002) (raising this point in the context of capital punishment). 
30 See, e.g., Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 765, 767, 779–805 (2013) (discussing the sharp disagreements within the Supreme Court in 
Citizens United on whether “corporations are entitled to the same First Amendment protection as 
natural persons”); Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate 
Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 577–80 (2012) (discussing criticisms of the Citizens United 
decision). 
31 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 349, 353 (2010) (indicating that 
the identity of the speaker, whether a corporation or an individual, does not make the speech more or 
less valuable, and that “[a]t the founding . . . there were no limits on the sources of speech and 
knowledge”). 
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with such groups.32  But regardless of the basis for extending First 
Amendment speech protection to nonprofits, for purposes of this Article, 
extension will be assumed (as it has apparently been by the Supreme Court 
well before the Citizens United decision33). 
The key question to consider is therefore whether the particular 
constitutional right at issue here, the First Amendment right to free speech, 
is one that nonprofits as assumed holders of that right can trade to the 
government in exchange for a benefit.  While in some constitutional 
contexts it may be very difficult to determine a clear answer to this 
question, for the reasons detailed below, that is not the case here. 
The first place to start answering this question is with the text and 
history of the First Amendment.34  In relevant part, it provides “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”35  On its face, the 
language does not suggest an ability on the part of the speaker to bargain 
this right away to the government unlike, for example, the Third 
Amendment.36  At the same time, however, the language does not clearly 
prohibit such bargaining.  While the term “abridging” could be interpreted 
as including laws that offer a speaker a benefit in return for waiving their 
freedom of speech in some respect or another, that interpretation is not 
necessarily correct.37  The history of the First Amendment is also unclear 
on this point.38 
                                                                                                                          
32 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens 
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 407, 418–19 (2011) (arguing that “the level of protection for institutional 
speech would depend on the strength of the speech’s connection to the desires of individuals affiliated 
with that institution,” including nonprofit corporations).  
33 See infra Part III (discussing the relevant Supreme Court decisions). 
34 See, e.g., Gey, supra note 24, at 955–57 (providing an analysis in determining the alienability 
of constitutional rights by examining the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments as examples). 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
36 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
37 See Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 
577 (1998) (“The constitutional text is assuredly as susceptible of one meaning as of the other . . . what 
constitutes a ‘law abridging the freedom of speech’ is either a matter of history or else it is a matter of 
opinion.” (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 688 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting))); Marin R. Scordato, The Elusive Paradigm of the Press, 72 B.U. L. REV. 673, 673 (1992) 
(reviewing LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS (1991)) (arguing that the complexity of the 
meaning of “abridging” is not natural, but instead is created because if the natural meaning of it was 
accepted, constitutional protection would be too broad); Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal 
Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 231, 248 (2011) (stating that the meaning of the First 
Amendment today has changed from what was asserted as the meaning by the ratifiers of the 
Constitution). 
38 See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits 
of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1291–96 (1998) (arguing, contrary to some legal 
historians, that freedom of speech was understood at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights as an 
inalienable natural right, and concluding that “this makes it difficult to attribute any precise original 
meaning to the First Amendment”); Rodney A. Smolla, Content and Context:  The Contributions of 
William Van Alstyne to First Amendment Interpretation, 54 DUKE L.J. 1623, 1633–34 (2005) 
(recognizing that “what history seems to make of the First Amendment is that the Amendment did not 
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Given the lack of clarity from either text or history, most 
commentators have looked instead to two related issues—the purpose of 
this constitutional right and whether that right is solely held by the speaker 
or also, at least in part, by the potential hearers of the speech.39  While 
stated in various ways, the purpose is generally found to be to protect 
freedom of all types.40  For example, the Supreme Court has stated that 
freedom of speech “safeguards a freedom which is the ‘matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.’”41  That 
purpose strongly suggests there is a public interest in preventing a speaker 
from trading away this freedom, particularly when the other party at the 
table is the State.42 
Relying on similar reasons, the ability of the speaker to trade away 
their freedom of speech is often questioned on the grounds that other 
parties—namely the potential hearers of the speech—are not also at the 
                                                                                                                          
mean much,” and arguing further that the restriction of “abridging the freedom of speech” was thought 
initially to only apply to Congress); see also Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment 
Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1080, 1091 (1991) (suggesting that James Madison and Roger 
Sherman viewed freedom of speech as an alienable natural right, but even if freedom of speech is an 
alienable natural right, Congress may only infringe on that right if it provides equivalent greater 
security and safety for individuals and society in exchange).  But see Mayton, supra note 23, at 390–91 
(arguing that the text and history of the First Amendment demonstrate that freedom of speech was 
viewed as a common good and is, therefore, inalienable as against the government).  Note that even if 
freedom of speech is an alienable natural right, meaning that the people may choose to surrender some 
aspect of that right as part of enacting a constitution, it may be an inalienable constitutional right to the 
extent it is provided for in that constitution, i.e., the right may only be alienable by the people acting 
collectively, not by each citizen or entity acting individually). 
39 See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (upholding First Amendment 
right to receive mailings from foreign governments); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The 
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1387 (1984) (“But many 
constitutional rights protect other values or protect individual choice only as a means to the realization 
of other ends.  For such rights, there is no paradox in asserting that the choice of the individual should 
not decide the applicability of the right in question.”); Burt Neuborne, Taking Hearers Seriously, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 1425, 1434–35 (2013) (reviewing TAMARA R.  PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012)) (noting that hearers have an 
independent right to receive information, and thus have a constitutional right as a hearer rather than 
only as a speaker). 
40 See, e.g., Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 987 
(2011) (“The First Amendment protects all those individuals and groups that would exercise their right 
to speak and communicate by disabling government from abridging the freedom of speech.”). 
41 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 327 (1937)).  
42 See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL 
L. REV. 261, 356 (1998) (arguing for courts to apply a more stringent standard of review to the waiver 
of First Amendment rights “because a waiver of speech rights implicates both the public’s interest as 
well as the individual’s interest”); Mayton, supra note 23, at 381 (contending that if the government 
can buy-off a speaker, “the community is denied speech, and in this way freedom of speech as a 
common good is limited”). 
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table.43  This conclusion is complicated by the fact that generally speakers 
are free to surrender their freedom of speech in trades with other private 
parties—indeed, that is seen as part of the freedom of speech—and the 
State will generally enforce such private bargains.44  Nevertheless, there is 
a difference when the other party is the State, because then the other party 
is acting pursuant to law enacted by Congress (or a state legislature) and so 
the language of the First Amendment is directly implicated in a manner not 
true in private-party-only transactions. 
Even those commentators who consider essentially all constitutional 
rights to be alienable, including with respect to the government, 
acknowledge that these last two considerations may render the right to 
freedom of speech an inappropriate one for bargaining between the speaker 
and government.45  For example, Daniel Farber suggests that perhaps any 
condition relating to speech results in an unacceptable level of externalities 
because the public has an interest in freedom of speech, not just the 
speaker.46  Richard Epstein makes a similar point, although to a more 
limited extent, arguing that if a speech-related condition distorts the 
political process by favoring some views over others then the condition is 
                                                                                                                          
43 See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 
BROOK. L. REV. 5, 18 (1989) (recognizing the distinction between speaker-centered and hearer-
centered benefits of free speech and how both are reasons for the protection of the right of free speech).  
44 Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1650, 1677–78 (2009) (acknowledging that “[t]he consensual waiver approach [which] views a 
person’s consent to the waiver of her First Amendment rights as dispositive for First Amendment 
purposes” has “a great deal of merit” but criticizing it both for being underinclusive and for failing to 
explain the problem of unconstitutional conditions, i.e., when the government is the party seeking the 
waiver); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a 
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2000) (recognizing that 
in the context of transactions between private parties, “the free speech right must turn on the rights of 
the speakers, and . . . it’s proper to let speakers contract away their rights”). 
45 These commentators generally draw on contract law to determine when otherwise alienable 
rights should be tradable to the state.  See Epstein, supra note 2, at 15–21 (noting that such bargains 
should not be permitted when either the state or the individual citizen can misuse the bargain either to 
benefit one group of citizens over another (the state) or to benefit himself or herself over all other 
citizens because of a monopoly position, collective action problems, or externalities); Farber, supra 
note 1, at 934 (arguing that constitutional rights can be viewed as contractual defaults, with departures 
from those defaults permitted unless the bargaining process is flawed by monopoly power, transaction 
costs, information asymmetries or other information problems, or exclusion of affected third parties, 
i.e., externalities); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary 
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 349 (discussing circumstances 
when permitting an individual to surrender an otherwise alienable constitutional right might be 
problematic); Sian E. Provost, Note, A Defense of Rights-Based Approach to Identifying Coercion in 
Contract Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 629, 632–33 (1995) (discussing generally how contracts between 
private parties will not be upheld if various forms of coercion are at play such as unequal bargaining 
powers, undue influence, economic coercion, or adhesion contracts). 
46 Farber, supra note 1, at 935. 
 2014] NONPROFITS, SPEECH, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 1057 
in fact unconstitutional.47  
The weight of authority and commentary therefore leads to the 
conclusion that in general the right of speech, whether speech by 
nonprofits or others, is inalienable with respect to the government 
regardless of whether one thinks constitutional rights are generally 
alienable with respect to the government.  This conclusion does not, 
however, end the inquiry regarding the application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine in this context.  Even if the right to freedom of speech 
is generally inalienable, there may still be situations when the government 
can constitutionally condition a benefit on acceptance of a speech-related 
restriction.48  The next Section considers when this may be the case. 
B.  When Is the Inalienable Constitutional Right to Free Speech Alienable? 
Under what circumstances, if any, should the government be able to 
condition a benefit on the surrender of an otherwise inalienable 
constitutional right?  Kathleen Sullivan argues generally for the 
inalienability of constitutional rights with respect to the government, but 
she also provides two avenues for governments to constitutionally 
condition benefits on the surrender of such rights.49  The first avenue is 
when the interference with a constitutional right is only an unintentional 
side effect of the benefit program at issue.  Sullivan provides the example 
of the government restricting food stamps to food purchases, which has the 
effect if not the specific intention of preventing the recipients from using 
the food stamps to buy contraceptives or a television ad—that is, otherwise 
constitutionally protected activities.50  She views this avenue as a relatively 
narrow one, however, with close cases falling outside of this exception to 
the general rule of inalienability.51 
                                                                                                                          
47 Epstein, supra note 2, at 74–79.  Some commentators have also identified broader concerns, 
such as efficiency, distributional concerns, and the relationship of the right to personal identity, as 
possibly being relevant to the question of alienability with respect to the government.  E.g., Sullivan, 
supra note 2, at 1481–86.  Sometimes personal consent is given as a solution to unconstitutional 
conditions.  But see Hamburger, supra note 25, at 481 (arguing that consent is even more concerning 
than the usual unconstitutional condition worries because consent can become itself a threat and it can 
create “many more loose ends” without fixing the actual problems). 
48 See Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American 
Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 747, 759 (2001) (arguing that there may be exceptions to the inalienability of constitutional 
rights that stem from a historical perspective of what the founders meant to be inalienable rights); 
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1501–02 (giving examples of when the government can constitutionally 
condition a benefit on acceptance of a speech-related condition).  But see Kreimer, supra note 39, at 
1386 (making an argument that unless the constitutional right is alienable, it cannot be waived or 
surrendered). 
49 Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1490–501. 
50 Id. at 1501. 
51 Id. at 1501–02. 
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More importantly, Sullivan argues that a “strict review” standard 
should apply in all other instances where a government provided benefit 
comes with a condition relating to the exercise of a constitutional right.52  
In her view, such strict review would require the government to 
demonstrate a compelling justification for the condition.53  Interestingly, 
however, she does not elaborate explicitly on the extent to which the 
benefit/condition arrangement needs to be closely or narrowly tailored to 
the asserted compelling justification, although she suggests that an analysis 
similar to that found when “strict scrutiny” applies is appropriate.54  
Perhaps the most obvious situation where a government benefit can 
still be conditioned on surrendering the right to free speech is when the 
government is paying the full cost of that speech.55  While the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally reflects the view that the 
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly,56 the opposite 
is generally true as well—the government should be able to do indirectly 
what it can do directly.  By this I mean that if the government is permitted 
to say X itself, it follows that the government should be able to pay a 
nonprofit or other private party to say X—in other words, the government 
has a compelling interest in ensuring that it gets what it pays for.57  This 
interest is rooted in the Spending Clause, which explicitly grants Congress 
the broad authority to “provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States.”58  At least as long as the government is 
paying the entire cost of the speech, the hired party should not be able to 
argue that as an exercise of its free speech rights it must be able to use the 
                                                                                                                          
52 Id. at 1499–500. 
53 Id. at 1503. 
54 Id. at 1506. 
55 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2008) (analyzing United States v. Rust, where the Court upheld the 
government’s regulation of subsidized doctors, thereby preventing them from discussing abortion with 
their patients); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 
983–88 (2005) (providing examples of where the government was able to direct private speech because 
the government provided the funding); Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 365, 374–75 (2009) (highlighting that the United States Supreme Court has affirmed the 
government’s ability to define the scope and limits of its spending programs, even if it involves 
viewpoint-based decisions).  
56 See, e.g., Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1217 (11th Cir. 
2013) (“[W]hat the state may not do directly it may not do indirectly.” (quoting Bailey v. Alabama, 219 
U.S. 219, 244 (1910))).  
57 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]e have 
permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or 
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message.”). 
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2327–28 (2013) (“The [Spending] Clause provides Congress broad discretion to 
tax or spend for the ‘general Welfare,’ including by funding particular state or private programs or 
activities.  That power includes the authority to impose limits on the use of such funds to ensure they 
are used in the manner Congress intends.”). 
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government-provided funds to say Y instead of X.  This may in fact be a 
better way to approach the previously mentioned exception posited by 
Sullivan for unintentional or incidental conditions, such as requiring the 
recipient of food stamps to spend those stamps on food and not, for 
example, on speech.59  If government is paying the full cost of an activity, 
it has the authority to limit the use of its funds even if by doing so it denies 
the recipient the ability to use those funds to exercise a constitutional right, 
such as speech. 
It is important, however, to note three important limitations on this 
exception to the inalienability of free speech rights with respect to the 
government.  First, the government must be paying the full cost of the 
speech or other activity at issue; that is, none of the private party’s 
financial resources, which otherwise it could use for speech of its 
choosing, are being consumed.60  (The next Part will explore situations 
where the speech is only partly funded by the government.)  Second, the 
speech or activity must be one that the government could make or do 
directly.  For example, the funded activity could not be speech endorsing a 
particular religious faith, as such speech would violate the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.61  Third, the government funding must not 
be for the purpose of creating a public forum designed to facilitate a broad 
range of private, not government, speech.  In that situation, the First 
Amendment bars the government from engaging in viewpoint 
discrimination, although it may permit content discrimination under some 
circumstances.62 
Part of the reason to interpret this exception narrowly is because the 
standard for review of conditions that do not fall within this exception 
should be one that mirrors the strict scrutiny standard that usually applies 
to direct government restrictions on speech.63  Exceptions to this strict 
                                                                                                                          
59 See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1438, 1501 (providing examples where the government 
incidentally or unintentionally alters the incentives for a benefits recipient to exercise his or her 
constitutional rights).  
60 See Olree, supra note 55, at 374 (providing examples of the Supreme Court upholding 
viewpoint-based funding decisions “as a permissible decision by the federal government about how it 
would design its own programs and spend its own money”). 
61 See Kreimer, supra note 39, at 1391 (using the Establishment Clause as an example of a 
constitutional provision that prevents the government from seeking the waiver of certain constitutional 
rights).  A better characterization of the Establishment Clause limitation on government authority, and 
indeed of many constitutional limitations on government authority, may be as a structural as opposed to 
individual rights-based limitation. 
62 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833–34.  For a discussion of the sometimes unclear distinction 
between viewpoint and content discrimination, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.  
63 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741–42 (2011) (holding that 
California’s ban on selling violent video games to minors was unconstitutional and the state could not 
meet its burden under a strict scrutiny test); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 467, 482 (2010) 
(deciding that a statute prohibiting depictions of animal cruelty was an overly broad burden on free 
speech after the lower court held that the state failed to meet its burden under a strict scrutiny test).  But 
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review should therefore be interpreted narrowly, lest they undermine the 
high bar that otherwise applies to government imposed limits on speech.  
The reason for applying a version of strict scrutiny adapted to the 
unconstitutional conditions context is that if the right to free speech is 
inalienable, the government should have to provide as strong a justification 
for burdening that right indirectly as it does directly.  That is, the 
government should not be able to escape the restrictions it faces on direct 
action by bargaining with a speaker, since such trading should not 
generally be permitted for the reasons already discussed.  If instead the 
standard of review for speech-restricting conditions was a lower one—such 
as the reasonableness standard essentially urged by the government in the 
recent Alliance case64—the government would be able to do indirectly 
what it could not do directly. 
While this approach has much in common with the methodology 
suggested by Sullivan more generally,65 this new approach goes further by 
arguing that not only must the government have a compelling interest for 
the speech-related condition, but the condition itself must be closely or 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.  Sullivan did not take this second 
step in her analysis, perhaps in part because she was trying to develop a 
more generally applicable unconstitutional conditions doctrine.66  At least 
in the speech context, however, this second step seems a necessary one lest 
the mere existence of a compelling interest in the general vicinity of a 
speech-related condition provide sufficient justification for that condition, 
even if the condition is only tenuously related to that interest.  A mere 
requirement that there be some type of connection between the condition at 
issue and a compelling governmental interest results in an extremely 
malleable test that undermines the requirement that the interest be 
compelling.67 
This approach differs from the “germaneness” standard applied in 
some other contexts that implicate the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.68  For example, in South Dakota v. Dole,69 the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                          
see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724, 2730–31 (2010) (holding that the 
material-support statute was not unconstitutional, although a strict scrutiny test was not applied, while 
Justice Breyer dissented arguing that strict scrutiny should have been applied to the government 
action); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358–59, 366–67 (2009) (finding that a ban on 
payroll deductions was not subject to a strict scrutiny test, with three justices dissenting at least in part, 
including one justice who advocated for usage of a strict scrutiny test).  
64 See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
65 See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1452–54 (stating that government monopoly on supplying a 
benefit always restricts beneficiaries’ choices, regardless of how the state created the monopoly).  
66 Id. at 1458. 
67 See id. at 1474 (making a similar argument that whether a condition is constitutional should 
turn on whether it is “germane” to the purpose of the benefit at issue). 
68 See Renée Lettow Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review 
Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 775–78 (2007) (outlining an analysis of constitutional conditions on 
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noted that conditions on federal grants to the states might be 
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment “if they are unrelated ‘to the 
federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”70  Merely 
being related to a particular national project or program is a far step from 
the condition being narrowly tailored to the relevant project or program, 
and also does not ensure that the purpose of the project or program is to 
further a compelling governmental interest, as illustrated by Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent highlighting the relatively loose connection between 
the condition at issue in that case and the federal government interest at 
stake.71  Similarly, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,72 the Supreme Court 
required something more rigorous than a rational basis standard in the 
context of a Fifth Amendment takings claim, calling instead for “rough 
proportionality” with a “legitimate state interest.”73  The very language the 
Court used confirms that the bar is set well below the standard of being 
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest—which should 
apply in the First Amendment speech context for the reasons already 
discussed. 
The approach proposed here also contrasts with the one urged, 
unsuccessfully, by the government in Alliance.  The government argued 
that “Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of 
federal assistance in order to further broad policy objectives,”74 and further 
stated that even heightened scrutiny would only apply when a funding 
condition “is aimed at suppressing dangerous ideas or disfavored 
viewpoints.”75  The government further argued that “Congress therefore 
reasonably decided that recipients should be required to make a 
commitment to the government that they will further central objectives of 
the very program under which they seek and accept federal funds,”76 
essentially confirming that the government was arguing for a 
reasonableness standard to apply to this type of situation.  The above 
analysis leads to the conclusion that a strict scrutiny standard should apply 
                                                                                                                          
the Institutional Review Board regime, which conditions federal funding of academic research on 
human beings at universities based on compliance with applicable federal statutes and regulations); Ilan 
Wurman, Note, Drug Testing Welfare Recipients as a Constitutional Condition, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
1153, 1178–84 (2013) (providing examples of unconstitutional conditions analyses in a variety of 
contexts and examining the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing as a condition of receiving 
welfare benefits). 
69 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
70 Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)). 
71 Id. at 214–15 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
72 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
73 Id. at 386, 391 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74 Brief for Petitioner at 17, Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2321 (2013) (No. 12-10). 
75 Id. at 13. 
76 Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
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instead. 
Applying a strict scrutiny standard as opposed to a reasonableness 
standard because of the burden on the exercise of free speech created by 
the condition at issue also tracks the standard applied by the Supreme 
Court in a number of other situations implicating constitutional rights that 
otherwise would only merit application of the reasonableness standard.  
For example, while economic legislation generally merits only application 
of the reasonableness standard, the Court has applied the strict scrutiny 
standard not only when speech is burdened by such legislation, but also 
when racial discrimination that may violate the Fifth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment is at issue, when other fundamental rights 
protected by those amendments are at issue, and when freedom of 
association is at issue.77  This is not to say that a burden on any 
constitutional right triggers strict scrutiny.  For example, after applying 
strict scrutiny, at least in name, to free exercise claims for several decades, 
in 1990 the Supreme Court reverted to a reasonableness standard when a 
law burdens religious exercise—so long as that law is a generally 
applicable and neutral one.78  But particularly in the context of laws that 
infringe on speech, the Court (and lower federal courts following the 
Court’s lead) has applied a strict scrutiny standard when the “government 
regulates protected speech on the basis of the substance of what is 
expressed.”79 
The above discussion therefore provides a framework for approaching 
speech-related conditions imposed on benefits provided to nonprofits.  It 
does not, however, fully answer the question of what interests might be 
compelling enough to justify such conditions, or what it means for a 
condition to be closely or narrowly tailored to further that interest.  The 
next Part begins to answer those questions by considering the actual 
disputes in this area that have reached the Supreme Court, particularly the 
recent Alliance case. 
III.  APPLYING UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS TO NONPROFIT SPEECH 
It is not difficult to identify actual disputes between nonprofits and 
                                                                                                                          
77 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny 
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 833–40 (2006) (discussing contexts in which the 
Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny).  As Winkler notes, this heightened standard can be traced back 
to the famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
Winkler, supra, at 798.  
78 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (upholding a denial of unemployment 
benefits as the ingestion of peyote for religious ceremonies still constitutes ingestion of illegal drugs for 
employment purposes); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, 
and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1157–58 (2009) (examining pre-Smith case 
law). 
79 Winkler, supra note 77, at 844. 
 2014] NONPROFITS, SPEECH, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 1063 
government involving speech-related conditions.  This Part focuses on 
three disputes resolved by the Supreme Court.  The first two involve, 
respectively, a condition on indirect government funding that did not 
involve a nonprofit speaking on behalf of the government (i.e., government 
speech) and a condition on direct government funding that may have 
involved government speech.  The third and most recent dispute, the 
Alliance case, involved a condition on direct government funding.  In that 
case, however, the Court shifted its categorization of cases from whether 
the government was funding government speech to whether the 
government was funding the program in which the speech occurred 
(regardless of whether the nonprofit was channeling the government’s 
voice).80  This shift is important because the understanding of the earlier 
cases among federal courts appears to have been that the government 
speech issue was critical.  This view, in turn, leads to the conclusion that 
speech-related conditions are more vulnerable constitutionally if the 
nonprofit beneficiary is not speaking on the government’s behalf but 
instead receiving government funding for other reasons—a conclusion that 
is consistent with the framework developed above.  If that view is now 
suspect, however, it moves the application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine in this context in the wrong direction. 
A.  Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington81 (“TWR”) 
involved a nonprofit organization challenging the lobbying limitation on 
charitable, educational, and similar organizations that claim both 
exemption from federal income tax and the ability to receive tax deductible 
charitable contributions (“charities”).82  The government funding was 
therefore indirect (through tax exemption and deductibility instead of 
through a grant) and intermingled with private funding, and the speech at 
issue was clearly not government speech.83  The Supreme Court 
nevertheless concluded the limitation was constitutional, in significant part 
because the nonprofit at issue had the option of creating a non-charitable 
affiliate that could engage in unlimited lobbying—that is, an affiliate that 
did not have access to the government “subsidy” provided through tax 
deductible charitable contributions.84 
The difficult issue raised by this case is that given the absence of 
government speech, the limitation on speech paid for with non-government 
funds is problematic.  That said, there are two related grounds for 
                                                                                                                          
80 Alliance, 133 S. Ct at 2327–28, 2332.  
81 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
82 Id. at 540–43.  
83 Id. at 544–46.  
84 Id. at 544–45. 
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concluding that permitting the alternate channel of a non-charitable 
affiliate for the limited speech renders the lobbying limitations sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest in ensuring the 
funds it provides are not used to pay for lobbying.  First, with respect to the 
charitable contribution deduction, if the availability of the deduction results 
in increased giving because of the tax savings at least some donors enjoy, 
then it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to separate the government 
subsidy from the private, donated funds. While each donor knows whether 
they benefit from the deduction (which for individuals is only available if 
they itemize their deductions), the recipient charities are unlikely to have 
this information, making it impractical for them to differentiate between 
subsidized and non-subsidized donations. 
It is possible, however, for charities to segregate their donations from 
their other sources of revenue.  If the deduction was the only subsidy, it 
could be argued that a better tailored condition would be one that only 
limited the use of contributions for lobbying, leaving charities free to spend 
other funds on lobbying in an unlimited amount.  The deduction is not the 
only subsidy, however, because the Court also identified the exemption 
from federal income tax as a subsidy.85  Since that subsidy is triggered by 
merely having gross income that is greater than deductible expenses, that 
subsidy is inseparable from all of the otherwise taxable income of the 
charity (which would likely be most if not all income other than 
contributions).86  The fact that Congress has chosen to permit other types 
of nonprofits to receive these tax subsidies and engage in unlimited 
lobbying does not undermine this reasoning as long as there is a reasonable 
basis for distinguishing them from charities.87 
It is true that an alternate system under which charities could lobby 
without limitation, but only by using non-contribution income and paying 
income tax on lobbying expenditures, would also accomplish the goal of 
eliminating government funding for lobbying.  That alternate system, 
however, does not appear to be better tailored to the government’s 
compelling interest in seeing its support only used for what it, permissibly, 
chooses to support than a system under which a charitable organization can 
                                                                                                                          
85 461 U.S. at 544.  But see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1447 
(2011) (refusing to equate tax credits with governmental expenditures in the standing context). 
86 The inability to separate the government funding from private funding was also present in 
United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 213–14 (2003), where the Court held that 
Congress could constitutionally condition access to a discount and grants that helped cover the cost of 
Internet access for public libraries installing Internet filtering software to block obscenity and child 
pornography. 
87 See TWR, 461 U.S. at 550–51 (concluding that Congress’s decision to permit tax-exempt 
veterans organizations to both receive deductible contributions and engage in unlimited lobbying was 
neither a violation of the Equal Protection Clause nor otherwise unconstitutional because it was not 
irrational for Congress to subsidize lobbying by veterans organizations but not charities). 
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easily create a closely related and even controlled non-charitable affiliate 
to engage in lobbying.88  So while the Court did not apply the exact 
framework developed above, the Court reached the same conclusion as is 
reached under this framework.  That said, and as emphasized in Justice 
Blackmun’s concurrence, the constitutionality of the lobbying limitation 
condition (and presumably the similar political campaign intervention 
prohibition) depends on it remaining relatively easy for charities to create 
such non-charitable affiliates.89 
The Supreme Court has since repeatedly appeared to indicate that this 
easily-created-affiliate reasoning enjoys the support of a majority of the 
Court.90  In fact, only a year later in FCC v. League of Women Voters,91 the 
Court struck down a speech-related condition on federal funding precisely 
because the statute at issue did not permit the creation of an affiliate 
organization to engage in the disfavored speech with nonfederal funds.92  
In League of Women Voters, Congress conditioned receipt of government 
funding by noncommercial stations through the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting on not engaging in “editorializing.”93  Unlike in TWR (and in 
Rust, discussed below), the government did not provide a means for 
affected stations to engage in the prohibited speech through a closely 
related affiliate using only private funds.94  That difference proved fatal to 
the government’s attempt to rely on TWR, since the Court found that the 
government failed to meet the First Amendment standard that applied in 
the broadcast context absent the ability to create such affiliates.95 
                                                                                                                          
88 The Internal Revenue Service takes the position that a charity may not be directly affiliated 
with or control, either directly or indirectly, a non-charitable affiliate that engages in political campaign 
intervention because a charity is not permitted to engage in any such activity; it does, however, permit 
indirect affiliation between such entities.  WARD L. THOMAS & JUDITH E. KINDELL, S. AFFILIATIONS 
AMONG POLITICAL, LOBBYING AND EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 255, 260, 264 (1999), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopics00.pdf. 
89 TWR, 461 U.S. at 553–54 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  For a case applying this reasoning to the 
prohibition on charities engaging in political campaign intervention, see Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 
211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
90 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (2013); Rust 
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197–98 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399–400 
(1984); see also Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 143 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court accepts 
this reasoning); Miriam Galston, Campaign Speech and Contextual Analysis, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
100, 116–17 (2007) (acknowledging that the majority of the justices accept this reasoning).  But see 
Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2334 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the ability to use a closely related 
affiliate to engage in lobbying was “entirely nonessential to the Court’s holding” in TWR). 
91 468 U.S. 364 (1984).  
92 Id. at 400–01.  
93 Id. at 366. 
94 Id. at 400. 
95 Id. at 384–86, 402. 
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B.  Rust v. Sullivan 
In Rust v. Sullivan,96 nonprofit organizations received federal funds 
under Title X of the Public Health Service Act to provide family-planning 
services.97  Regulations under that provision prohibited “Title X projects” 
from providing information regarding abortion as a method of family 
planning and further required such projects to be physically and financially 
separate from any prohibited abortion activities.98  The organizations and 
doctors associated with them argued the regulations were unconstitutional 
both with respect to the limitations on speech funded by the Title X grants 
and with respect to the limitations on speech funded by non-federal funds 
but which were not spent in a physically separate facility.99  In contrast to 
TWR, Rust therefore involved direct government funding.  The Court 
characterized the challenge as a facial one to the regulations and concluded 
the regulations were in fact, on their face, constitutional.100 
 With respect to the limitation on speech funded by the government, 
the requirement that the speech be fully funded by the government was 
met.101  The other requirement for the limitation to be constitutional—that 
the speech be speech the government could engage in directly—was a 
matter of dispute since the speech was about family planning and yet 
explicitly did not include discussion of abortion, the right to which is 
constitutionally protected under other Supreme Court decisions.102  It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to address that dispute, but if the majority 
was correct that such selective speech by the government was permitted 
constitutionally then this requirement was met as well.103  So under the 
framework developed above, the Court was correct in its conclusion that 
the limitation on speech fully funded by the government was 
constitutional. 
The limitation on speech funded by non-federal funds is more 
problematic, however.  As written, the majority opinion appears to 
conclude that the limitation is constitutional because it is a reasonable 
requirement to ensure federal funds are not used for the prohibited 
speech.104  The separate physical facility requirement is not, however, 
                                                                                                                          
96 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
97 Id. at 178–79. 
98 Id. at 179–80. 
99 Id. at 181, 192. 
100 Id. at 177–78. 
101 See id. at 192–193 (“[T]he Government may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over 
abortion, and . . .  implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”).  
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 201–02 (“The difficulty that a woman encounters when a Title X project does not 
provide abortion counseling or referral leaves her in no different position than she would have been if 
the Government had not enacted Title X.”). 
104 Id. at 194–95. 
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narrowly tailored to further the government’s compelling interest in 
ensuring its funds are spent as it has directed.  Less burdensome measures, 
such as requiring careful cost accounting, plausibly would be sufficient to 
satisfy this interest.105  On its face, therefore, the speech-related condition 
limiting the use of non-federal funds is not constitutional under the 
framework developed above. 
An interesting aspect of subsequent decisions relying on this case is, 
however, that several of those later decisions appear to engage in what is 
arguably revisionist history by characterizing the government-funded 
speech as not only government-funded but in fact government speech, 
albeit done through a private party.106  While this reading may not be 
accurate, it makes the result in the case consistent with the framework 
proposed here.  Under this reading of the case, the government has a 
compelling interest not only in ensuring that its funds are spent on their 
designated purpose but also in ensuring that its speech is not undermined 
by or confused with other, non-government speech that is coming from the 
same speaker in the same physical facility.107  In the case of government 
speech, therefore, the separate physical facility requirement is arguably 
                                                                                                                          
105 In fact, the petitioners in Rust argued that the physical separation requirement imposed a 
substantial burden on their speech and might in fact make it impossible for them to engage in desired 
speech with non-government funds.  Brief for Petitioners at 27–30, Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (No. 89-1391).  
The Supreme Court did not directly address this argument. 
106 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (“The Court in Rust did not 
place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X 
amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have 
explained Rust on this understanding.”); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (characterizing the situation in Rust as one where “the government did not create 
a program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific 
information pertaining to its own program”); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 
758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Under Rust, as interpreted by Rosenberger and Velazquez, the government 
may thus constitutionally communicate a particular viewpoint through its agents and require those 
agents not convey contrary messages.”); Brian H. Bix, Perfectionist Policies in Family Law, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1055, 1059 & n.24 (reviewing LINDA MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING 
CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY) (stating that the “Court’s views on government speech 
and subsidy of speech are scanty and inconsistent” while also stating that the Court distinguished Rust 
in several subsequent cases and reaffirmed the government’s right “to subsidize viewpoints selectively 
when the government . . . uses private speakers to promote the government’s views”); Deborah Kelly, 
Note, The Legal Services Corporation’s Solicitation Restriction and the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine: Has the Death Knell Sounded for Future Challenges to the Restriction?, 29 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 247, 270 n.160 (2004) (stating that the majority opinion in Rust has since been distinguished 
in subsequent cases to apply only to “instances of governmental speech”).  Interestingly, Justice 
Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinions in both Velazquez and Rosenberger, but there is no overlap 
between the other justices in the five-justice majorities in the two cases (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer comprised the majority in Velazquez and Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas comprised 
the majority in Rosenberger).  Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 533; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819. 
107 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (“When the government disburses public funds to private 
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that 
its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.”). 
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narrowly tailored to a compelling interest because of this risk of such 
undermining or confusion.  
As these two different views and results demonstrate, it was therefore 
critical whether the speech at issue is only government-funded or is in fact 
also identified as government speech, at least prior to the recent Alliance 
decision.  The line between these two types of speech can be difficult to 
draw.108  Given the strict scrutiny that applies to speech-related conditions, 
the government should have the burden of clearly demonstrating that the 
speech was government speech.  What arguably was absent in Rust was 
such a clear demonstration, and absent such a clear demonstration the 
government should not have been able to impose a speech-related 
condition.  The Court therefore was incorrect to uphold as constitutional 
the limitation on the non-government funded speech, at least on the record 
available to it at the time.  The revised version of the facts apparently 
adopted by the Court in later decisions would, however, have provided a 
sufficient basis for upholding the limitation on non-government funded 
speech at issue in Rust.  In its latest decision in this area, however, the 
Supreme Court avoided this distinction by instead reformulating the key 
issue as whether the condition is within or outside of a government 
spending program, a shift that both could have significant consequences in 
this area and is contrary to the framework proposed in this Article.109 
C.  Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society 
International 
In the most recent dispute in this area to reach the Supreme Court, at 
issue was a provision of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (“the Act”) that barred funding 
under the Act for any group or organization “that does not have a policy 
explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.”110  To enforce this 
prohibition, the implementing agencies required the recipients of funding 
under the Act to document their opposition to prostitution and sex 
trafficking.111  The agencies also established guidelines requiring sufficient 
                                                                                                                          
108 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 163 (1996) (“The criteria for 
establishing whether speech ought to be characterized as public discourse [a subset of non-
governmental speech that contributes to democratic self-governance], are complex, contextual, and 
obscure, and particularly so in cases of subsidized speech.  I am confident that there can be no simple 
empirical or descriptive line of demarcation.” (footnote omitted)).  In part to address this difficulty, 
Post develops a new category of speech that he characterizes as speech within a “managerial” domain.  
Id. at 164. 
109 See infra notes 131–36 and accompanying text (discussing Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. v. 
Legal Services Corp., 462 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
110 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (2013) 
(quoting 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111 Id. at 2326. 
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separation from any affiliated entities that did not comply with this 
requirement, with the sufficiency of such separation determined based on 
not only the extent of legal and financial separation but also the extent to 
which the organizations maintained separate personnel and physical 
facilities.112 
Under the framework developed above, the government is 
constitutionally permitted to provide funding that can only be used for 
speech opposing prostitution, assuming the government could engage in 
such speech directly, and to bar the use of its funding for any speech or 
activity promoting prostitution.  The Act here, in fact, included such a bar, 
which was not challenged in this litigation.113  The challenged provision 
went further, however, in that it required the recipient groups to also 
comply with speech-related restrictions relating to their use of non-
government funds by affirmatively taking a position opposing prostitution 
and sex trafficking, with the ability to take an inconsistent position 
permitted only if they not only acted through an affiliate, but an affiliate 
that was sufficiently separate from the group receiving funds under the 
Act. 
As discussed in connection with Rust, such restrictions on the use of 
private funds might be justified if the recipient of the government funding 
was clearly identified as speaking on behalf of the government and a 
failure to maintain this level of separation would undermine or confuse that 
government speech.114  But also as noted with respect to Rust, if speech-
related conditions are subject to strict scrutiny as proposed in this Article, 
the government should bear the burden of demonstrating both that clearly 
the speech was government speech, not merely government-funded speech, 
and that the degree of separation required is necessary to protect the 
integrity of that speech.115  The record in this case indicates the 
government failed to make either demonstration.  The funding was not for 
an anti-prostitution messaging campaign on behalf of the government, 
which campaign would be clearly undermined if in essentially the 
organization’s next (non-government funded) breath the recipient group 
could contradict that message.  Rather, the funding was for programs 
combatting HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria more generally.116  In 
addition, the government was requiring the recipient organizations to 
assume for all purposes an anti-prostitution position as their own 
                                                                                                                          
112 Id. at 2326–27. 
113 Id. 
114 See text accompanying supra note 106.  
115 See text accompanying supra note 107. 
116 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 218, 237–38, 264 
(2d Cir. 2011) (“The stated purpose of the Leadership Act is to fight HIV/AIDS, as well as tuberculosis, 
and malaria.  Defendants cannot now recast the Leadership Act’s global HIV/AIDS-prevention 
program as an anti-prostitution messaging campaign.” (footnote omitted)). 
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position—not merely to promulgate that position on behalf of the 
government.117   
The Supreme Court did not rely on the government speech versus 
private speech divide, however (the “speech” approach).  Instead, the 
Court recharacterized the relevant divide as between “conditions that 
define the limits of the government spending program—those that specify 
the activities Congress wants to subsidize—and conditions that seek to 
leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours of the program 
itself.”118  It then cited TWR, League of Women Voters, and Rust as 
exemplifying this “spending” approach, categorizing TWR and Rust as 
involving speech-related conditions only on the relevant government 
spending program and League of Women Voters as involving conditions 
relating to speech outside the contours of such a program.119 
This is a subtle but important, and ultimately problematic, shift.  Under 
either the speech or the spending approach, a one hundred percent 
government funded effort may constitutionally have speech-related 
conditions—that is, the government has a compelling interest in getting 
what it is paying for—subject to the three limitations noted earlier.120  
Similarly, if a government-imposed condition restricts speech that is not 
funded by the government and is clearly separate from and does not 
interfere with or undermine the government-funded activities or speech, 
then such a condition is almost certainly unconstitutional under either the 
speech or the spending approach.  The differing approaches may, however, 
lead to significantly different results in between these extremes for at least 
two reasons. 
First, the speech approach is significantly narrower than the spending 
approach in that it only allows a lower level of constitutional protection for 
a significantly smaller segment of activities.  TWR provides a striking 
example of this difference.  TWR did not involve government speech—
charities that receive government subsidies in the form of tax deductible 
contributions are not speaking on behalf of the government in any way.121  
Yet, using the spending approach, the Supreme Court in Alliance 
characterized TWR’s activities—and by extension, the activities of all 
charities—as a government spending program.122  The spending approach 
therefore creates the possibility of speech-related restrictions being 
permitted, as a constitutional matter, on a much broader range of activities 
                                                                                                                          
117 Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2330. 
118 Id. at 2328. 
119 Id. at 2328–29. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 61–62. 
121 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 542 (1983) (recognizing that 
Taxation with Representation “proposes to advocate its point of view” (emphasis added)). 
122 Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2328–29. 
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that receive some level of government support even if those activities do 
not constitute government speech. 
Relatedly, the spending approach as described by the Supreme Court 
would subject any activity that received even a relatively small proportion 
of funding from the government as a government spending program and 
thus subject to less protection from speech-related conditions under the 
First Amendment.  While TWR involved activities only partially funded by 
the government, for the reasons detailed above, it was difficult—if not 
impossible—for a charity to separate the government funding stream from 
private sources because of how tax deductions and tax exemptions 
function, and so requiring charities to create separate affiliates that do not 
receive any government funding to engage in the speech at issue 
(lobbying) was narrowly tailored to further the compelling governmental 
interest in not having the government funds be used for such speech.123  
This was only true, however, if the burden of creating and maintaining 
such entities was relatively light.124 
This contrasts with the situation in Rust, which at least later decisions 
characterized as involving government speech.125  In Rust, the Supreme 
Court upheld the speech-related condition even though the government 
required that a privately funded affiliate that engaged in the speech at issue 
not only be legally and financially separate but also have separate staff and 
physical facilities.126  If, therefore, the spending approach is the one to be 
used going forward, as opposed to the speech approach, it would suggest 
that the government could constitutionally require the lobbying affiliate of 
a charity to not only be legally and financially separate but also, as was the 
case in Rust, to have separate staffs and facilities even if doing so would 
impose a substantial burden on the ability of the charity to engage in 
substantial lobbying through that affiliate.  This result would be 
inconsistent with both the TWR majority opinion and the more extensive 
discussion of this issue in Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, which at least 
up to now appeared to have been adopted by the Court in its later 
decisions.127 
The Supreme Court in Alliance did not accept an argument by the 
government along these lines, but the reason it cited for not doing so turned 
on the fact that the speech-related condition in this case did not only forbid 
certain speech, but affirmatively required certain speech.128  More 
                                                                                                                          
123 See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
126 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 180–81 (1991) (describing the required degree of 
separation). 
127 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
128 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2330–31 (2013). 
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specifically, the government argued that the speech-related condition was 
constitutional because it allowed recipients of funding under the Act to 
establish affiliates that communicated a contrary message relating to 
prostitution as long those affiliates were sufficiently separate.129  The Court 
rejected this argument, reasoning that the speech-related condition required 
a recipient to state a specific belief and so if the affiliate was closely 
enough associated with the recipient such that the affiliate’s speech would 
be considered effectively the recipient’s speech (although funded with non-
governmental funds), “the recipient can express those beliefs [that are 
contrary to opposing legalization of prostitution] only at the price of 
evident hypocrisy.”130  The Court, therefore, did not address the situation 
where the condition imposed by the government only prohibited certain 
speech as opposed to requiring certain speech, leaving open the possibility 
that the affiliate argument would have been successful in that situation 
even if the government required the affiliate to be separate not only legally 
and financially, but also physically and with respect to its staff. 
The existence of this possibility is significant for at least three reasons.  
First, under the speech approach that appears to have controlled before this 
decision, the government would bear the more difficult burden of 
demonstrating that the recipient was in fact speaking on behalf of the 
government before the government could constitutionally require an 
affiliate engaging in the prohibited speech to have a high (and likely 
burdensome) level of separation.  Under the spending approach, all the 
government has to show is that there is at least partial government funding, 
that the condition prohibits speech but does not require it, and that the 
government permits the recipient to engage in the prohibited speech with 
non-governmental funds through an affiliate that satisfies a reasonable (not 
narrowly tailored) separation requirement.  As the petitioners in Rust 
noted, requiring separate physical facilities and separate staffs will often 
impose significant additional financial costs.131 
Second, this shift could resolve in the government’s favor a long-
running dispute involving legal services organizations, albeit a dispute that 
was already trending the government’s way.  The dispute involves the 
government subjecting recipients of government funding from the Legal 
Services Corporation132 to a requirement that they engage in certain 
speech-related activities—such as participating in class action lawsuits and 
                                                                                                                          
129 Id. at 2331. 
130 Id. 
131 See supra note 105. 
132 The Legal Services Corporation is a federally funded charitable nonprofit controlled by 
directors appointed by the President (and confirmed by the Senate); it distributes federal funds to 
independent nonprofit legal aid programs across the country.  Fact Sheet on the Legal Services 
Corporation, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
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in-person solicitation of clients—only through affiliates that are legally, 
financially, and physically separate from the entity receiving the 
government funding.133  While the federal courts considering this challenge 
and similar challenges have generally concluded that this requirement is 
constitutional,134 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit left open 
the possibility that the requirement would be unconstitutional as applied to 
the plaintiffs if they could demonstrate that the requirement did not provide 
an adequate alternative means of engaging in the speech using private 
funds, remanding the case back to the federal district court to resolve this 
factual point.135  At the same time, the Second Circuit rejected the 
compelling interest, narrowly tailored approach urged in this Article,136 and 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alliance would provide further support 
for that rejection. 
Third, this shift could possibly allow the government to impose this 
higher separation requirement on affiliates created by charities to engage in 
lobbying (and political campaign intervention) beyond the limits permitted 
for charities themselves, effectively overruling TWR in this regard.  There 
are, however, at least two potential barriers to this outcome.  First, neither 
Congress nor the Treasury Department may have any interest in imposing 
such a requirement given that charities and their non-charitable, tax-
exempt affiliates from across the political spectrum have long relied on the 
ability of charities to easily create affiliates in order to engage in lobbying 
and political campaign intervention.137  The Internal Revenue Service has 
been particularly solicitous in this regard, although in large part because it 
apparently felt that TWR required that approach.138  While there have 
                                                                                                                          
133 See Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 222–23 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(discussing the prohibition of certain speech related activities); Kelly, supra note 106, at 256 (stating 
that certain restrictions prohibit LSC fund recipients from engaging in various speech related acts). 
134 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198–99 (1991) (finding that “Title X projects” that were 
physically and financially separate from any prohibited abortion activities regulations were in fact, on 
their face, constitutional); DKT Int’l v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(finding that a subsidiary could constitutionally qualify for government funds as long as the two 
organizations’ activities were kept sufficiently separate). 
135 Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d at 223–24, 232–33.  Recently, plaintiffs in the Second 
Circuit litigation voluntarily dismissed their case without public explanation.  Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal by Bronx Legal Services, Dobbins v. Legal Servs. Corp., No. 1:01-CV-08371 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 23, 2013). 
136 Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d at 229–30. 
137 See THOMAS & KINDEL, supra note 88, at 255 (“In an increasingly common arrangement, an 
[Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”)] 501(c)(3) educational organization formally or informally affiliates 
with an IRC 501(c) (4), (5), or (6) lobbying organization with a related IRC 527 political organization 
or PAC.”). 
138 See Memorandum from Lois G. Lerner, Dir., Exempt Org., Internal Revenue Serv., to Marsha 
Ramirez, Dir., Examinations, Internal Revenue Serv. (Apr. 17, 2008), available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2008_paci_program_letter.pdf (“Enforcement in this area requires [the IRS 
Exempt Organizations Division] to consider the implications of Taxation with Representation of 
Washington, particularly Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion.”). 
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recently been numerous calls for reining in non-charitable tax-exempt 
organizations, particularly with respect to political campaign intervention, 
those criticisms do not appear to have created much momentum for 
legislation or regulatory change.139  This barrier is political, however, not 
constitutional. 
The second potential barrier is the third limitation on the government 
controlling how its funds are spent with respect to speech noted above.140  
That limitation is the holding in the Rosenberger case: if the government 
funds a public forum in which it permits and indeed encourages many 
forms of private speech, it generally may not discriminate based on 
viewpoint with respect to the speech it funds, although it may discriminate 
based on content if such discrimination preserves the limited purposes of 
the forum.141  While what distinguishes “content” discrimination from 
“viewpoint” discrimination is not completely clear from the opinion, or, 
indeed, subsequent case law, it is a distinction the Court continues to 
support.142  This barrier is not, however, very strong, in that Rosenberger 
cited TWR as an example of a situation where viewpoint discrimination did 
not occur.143  That is, restrictions that apply to lobbying (and political 
campaign intervention) are only content restrictions and not viewpoint 
restrictions—as long as they apply to all lobbying and not lobbying from a 
particular policy or political perspective.  This conclusion appears 
unavoidable, and thus Rosenberger is not in fact a real barrier to the 
government imposing a higher separation requirement. 
Finally, it should be noted that the government also was unsuccessful 
with an affiliate argument in the Citizens United campaign finance case.144  
                                                                                                                          
139 The limited amount of bipartisan support for proposals along these lines makes their passage 
unlikely given the current partisan divide in Congress.  See Kenneth P. Doyle, 501(c)(4) Limit, 
Corporate, Union Disclosure, Combined in Rep. Cartwright’s New Measure, BLOOMBERG BNA 
MONEY & POL. REP., July 16, 2013 (reporting on the introduction of a bill in this area by House 
Democrat with twenty House Democrat co-sponsors but no apparent Republican support); Kenneth P. 
Doyle, New Murkowski-Wyden Disclosure Measure Stirs Hope for Bipartisan Campaign Reform, 
BLOOMBERG BNA MONEY & POL. REP., Apr. 24, 2013 (reporting on the introduction of a bipartisan 
campaign finance bill, but quoting the participating Republican Senator as conceding that passage 
would not be easy). 
140 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.   
141 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995). 
142 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (stating that in the context of 
speech on government property, “any restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict 
scrutiny . . . and restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited” (citation omitted)); Rosenberger, 515 
U.S. at 831 (“[I]t must be acknowledged, the distinction [between content discrimination and viewpoint 
discrimination] is not a precise one.”).  But see Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 
584–86 (1998) (concluding that the NEA could constitutionally make aesthetic judgments, including 
taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the “diverse beliefs and values of 
the American public” when making funding decisions). 
143 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
144 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 356, 361 (2010). 
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In that case, the government was defending the ban on corporate general 
treasury spending on express advocacy and electioneering 
communications.145  In holding that ban unconstitutional, the Supreme 
Court discussed whether the ability of a corporation to create a political 
action committee, or PAC, provided a constitutionally sufficient alternate 
channel for the corporation’s speech.146  The Court concluded that it did 
not, both because, as a separate entity, a PAC is not the corporation, so its 
speech is not the corporation’s speech, and because PACs “are burdensome 
alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive 
regulations.”147  This conclusion likely is not incompatible with either TWR 
or Rust; however, a key distinction between Citizens United and the 
various unconstitutional conditions cases is that the latter cases involve 
government funding while Citizens United does not.148 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Alliance therefore appears to have 
both muddied the waters even more in this area and moved the Court in the 
wrong direction.  Rather than clarifying the approaches taken in the earlier 
cases addressing similar situations, it instead recharacterized them in a 
manner that leaves even the strength of those cases as precedents uncertain.  
Is the critical factual determination whether the funded activity is 
government speech, as some cases have suggested, or is it now whether the 
speech condition is outside of a government spending program?  Alliance 
suggests the latter,149 but its failure to even acknowledge the former 
distinction makes it unclear whether that distinction also is still relevant.  
Alliance left undisturbed the (recharacterized) holding in League of Women 
Voters that a speech prohibition reaching beyond a government spending 
program is unconstitutional if the funding recipient is not permitted to 
engage in the speech as well, whether directly or through an affiliate.  It, 
however, left uncertain under what circumstances the government can only 
require such an affiliate to be minimally separate from the funding 
recipient, as was the case in TWR, as opposed to being able to require a 
significantly greater (and more burdensome) extent of separation, as was 
the case in Rust and is the case in the legal services dispute.  
It could be argued that the Court’s adoption of a spending approach in 
Alliance is more consistent with the Rust decision in that the later 
                                                                                                                          
145 Id. at 318–19.  
146 Id. at 337, 339. 
147 Id. at 337. 
148 It has been argued that the state law benefits enjoyed by corporations are akin to a subsidy, but 
it is not clear that the Citizens United Court accepted that argument.  Mayer, supra note 32, at 416.  
There are also numerous reasons to conclude that Citizens United did not implicitly overrule TWR.  Id. 
at 415–16. 
149 See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013) 
(suggesting that the regulation of the speech condition is outside the context of a government spending 
program). 
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characterization of the latter case as involving government speech did not 
reflect the actual facts of that case.150  For the reasons already discussed, 
however, if Rust did not involve government speech, then the case was 
wrongly decided under the framework put forward by this Article.151  If 
indirect restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny, as argued 
above, then the government can only impose such restrictions as a 
condition for receiving government funding either if the funding is for 
government speech and permitting the targeted speech would undermine 
that government communication, or if an easy alternate way is provided for 
engaging in such speech without the use of the government funding.  In 
Alliance, neither situation applied.  The speech in Alliance was not 
apparently government speech that would be undermined unless the 
recipient, as an entity, declared its opposition to the legalization of 
prostitution.  Furthermore, the alternate way provided by the government 
was insufficient not only because it would be ineffective (since the 
affiliate’s speech, if truly the speech of the recipient, would be hypocritical 
because it would be in direct conflict with the affiliate’s (compelled) 
speech) but because it went well beyond what was arguably necessary to 
ensure the recipient used the government funds as directed.  Alliance, 
therefore, is problematic under the framework argued for here, both 
because not only is it in itself inconsistent with that framework, but also 
because it reverses the longstanding (albeit perhaps untrue to the facts of 
the case) interpretation of Rust that was consistent with that framework. 
Lastly, the argument of the dissent in Alliance is that the government 
should be free to choose recipients who adhere to the government’s 
preferred views generally and not just in government-funded 
communications.152  The majority argues both that this approach ignores 
aspects of the Court’s own precedents and that the dissent incorrectly 
discounts the effect of the speech-related condition by characterizing it as 
only a selection criterion when it in fact serves as an incentive for potential 
recipients to adopt a position they otherwise would not adopt.153  The first 
criticism is correct, although the majority is also guilty of selective 
ignorance with respect to the relevant precedents, as discussed above.154  
The problem with the second criticism is that the dissent is correct that 
there is no coercion, in the sense of an offer the recipients cannot refuse, 
                                                                                                                          
150 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
152 See Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance of the 
government’s freedom to choose which programs to assist based on similar viewpoints). 
153 See id. at 2328, 2330 (majority opinion) (suggesting that the policy condition proposed by the 
dissent “goes beyond defining the limits of the federally funded program to defining the recipient”). 
154 See supra notes 118–19 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Rust, Regan, and League of Women Voters in the context of activities that receive government 
funding). 
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here.155  Instead there is simply a purchasing of the recipient’s 
constitutional right to free speech—whether that speech is government 
funded or not, since the required position must be adopted by the recipient 
as its own.  But under the framework developed in this Article, that is the 
heart of the constitutional problem: If speech rights are generally 
inalienable as against the government under the First Amendment, and if 
therefore any abridgement of such rights by the government—whether 
direct or indirect—is subject to strict scrutiny, then the government is not 
permitted to buy an organization’s speech absent a compelling 
governmental interest in doing so and then only if the purchase is done in a 
manner that is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  This standard 
cannot be met under the facts in Alliance. 
The Alliance decision could therefore significantly increase the ability 
of the government to impose speech-related conditions on nonprofits that 
receive government funding in any form.  As already noted, it solidifies the 
government’s victories in the Legal Services Corporation dispute and 
potentially opens the door to the government imposing greater burdens on 
charities that create non-charitable affiliates to engage in speech that 
exceeds the limits imposed on the charities themselves.  It also could 
permit both the federal and state governments to attach speech-related 
conditions to any of the vast array of government funding mechanisms that 
benefit nonprofits—not only contracts and grants, but also fees for services 
(such as health care) and indirect funding mechanisms such as exemptions 
from state and local taxes.  For example, in recent years there have been 
attempts to tie federal National and Community Service Act funds to limits 
on lobbying by both the recipient organization and any “co-locat[ing]” 
entity156 and to require affordable housing grant recipients to not engage in 
any election-related activity even with private funds and on a completely 
nonpartisan and neutral basis;157 both of these measures successfully made 
it through the House of Representatives.  While constitutionally suspect 
under both the framework proposed here and pre-Alliance case law, post-
Alliance it is far less clear that such restrictions would be found by the 
courts to be unconstitutional conditions. 
                                                                                                                          
155 See Alliance, 133 S. Ct. at 2334 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, as I suggested earlier, the 
contention that the condition here ‘coerces’ respondents’ speech is on its face implausible.  Those 
organizations that wish to take a different tack with respect to prostitution ‘are as unconstrained now as 
they were before the enactment of [the Leadership Act].’” (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
156 Generations Invigorating Volunteerism and Education Act, H.R. 1388, 111th Cong., § 1304(b) 
(as passed by House, Mar. 18, 2009). 
157 Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 1461, 109th Cong., § 128 (as passed by 
House, Oct. 26, 2005). 
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IV.  BROADER RAMIFICATIONS 
The previous Parts have developed and applied a framework for 
addressing the constitutionality of speech-related conditions imposed on 
government funding provided, whether directly or indirectly, to nonprofit 
organizations.  The framework is both consistent with the Constitution and 
provides significant clarity to this area of law, clarity which the shifting 
reasoning of Supreme Court opinions, and particularly the recent Alliance 
decision, demonstrate is much needed.  The approach taken in this Article 
may also help to clarify the application of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine more generally in two important ways.  First, the specific 
framework used here may be applicable to speech-related conditions 
imposed in other contexts, such as in the campaign finance area.  Second, 
the customized approach employed here may prove useful in more 
disparate constitutional settings. 
A.  Speech in Other Contexts 
As others have detailed, attempts to develop global approaches to 
unconstitutional conditions have been unsuccessful in large part because of 
the many different constitutional contexts in which such conditions can 
arise.158  This Article takes a different approach by focusing on how the 
doctrine should apply in a specific constitutional and factual context.  By 
doing so, it is much easier to develop a coherent and constitutionally 
supportable approach.  At the same time, however, that approach need not 
only be of use in the particular context of its origin.  While the conflicts 
discussed in this Article related to speech and benefits received by 
nonprofit organizations, such disputes also extend to for-profit 
organizations.  For example, the existing prohibition on federal campaign 
contributions from persons with government contracts faces a court 
challenge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.159  While not characterized as an unconditional conditions case by 
                                                                                                                          
158 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 2, at 27 (“[The] hierarchy of legal rights makes the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions especially difficult to apply to complex modern statutory schemes that 
implement explicit or implicit transfers of wealth for purposes now regarded as unquestionably 
legitimate—for example, to regulate land use, or to help the needy or unemployed.”); Gabriel Gillett, 
Note, A World Without Internet: A New Framework for Analyzing a Supervised Release Condition that 
Restricts Computer and Internet Access, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 217, 231 (2010) (“Though the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is centuries old, it remains difficult to predict when it applies, and 
if it applies, when it is violated.”). 
159 See Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacating the judgment of the 
district court and remanding the case to the district court for certification of facts and constitutional 
questions to the en banc court of appeals within five days of the opinion); Kenneth P. Doyle, 
Contractor Campaign Money Case to Be Heard by D.C. Circuit Sept. 30, BLOOMBERG BNA MONEY & 
POL. REP., June 20, 2013 (“A constitutional challenge to the long-standing federal ban on campaign 
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the district court,160 the case could and probably should be characterized in 
this way—the ability to receive a government contract is generally a 
benefit to which private parties do not have a right, and the campaign 
contributions bar imposed on persons receiving this benefit is a speech-
related condition under current case law.161  The resolution of this 
challenge should therefore turn on an application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine, and therefore, the principles developed with respect to 
nonprofit organizations in similar situations should also apply.  The more 
coherent framework developed here could have application outside of the 
limited context of speech-related conditions imposed on benefits received 
by nonprofit organizations. 
Another specific situation implicated by this reasoning is speech by 
public employees.  In this context, the Supreme Court has made a 
distinction between such employees speaking as citizens addressing 
matters of public concern, in which case they enjoy First Amendment 
protection from government retaliation for their speech, balanced against 
the government’s need as an employer to operate efficiently and 
effectively, and when they are not doing so, in which case no First 
Amendment protection is available.162  As Randy Kozel has detailed, 
however, the Court has failed to provide an adequate theoretical basis for 
the balancing test it has adopted in this area.163  Kozel proposes instead a 
presumption of parity for First Amendment purposes between citizens and 
government employees, a presumption that can only be overcome if there 
is “a valid reason for permitting the government to treat the employee 
differently from her peers in the citizenry at large.”164  While Kozel does 
not employ level of scrutiny language in his proposed approach to this 
situation, adopting the framework proposed here would appear to be 
consistent with his approach of limiting rebuttal of the presumption of 
                                                                                                                          
money from government contractors will be considered by the full federal appeals court for 
Washington, D.C., in an argument now set for the end of September.”). 
160 See Wagner v. FEC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2012) (analyzing the case under a First 
Amendment challenge and an equal-protection argument), vacated by 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013); 
Wagner v. FEC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 83, 85 (D.D.C. 2012) (evaluating three federal contractors’ motion for 
a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of success of their First Amendment and Fifth 
Amendment equal-protection claims). 
161 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“Buckley recognized that 
contribution limits . . . ‘implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,’ namely, the freedoms of 
‘political expression’ and ‘political association.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976))); 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 (“A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and 
his views . . . .”). 
162 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 597–98 (1972) (applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to an allegedly speech-related 
denial of public employment). 
163 Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity: A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1985, 2008–09 (2012). 
164 Id. at 2011. 
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parity only to situations where an employee speaks in discharging official 
responsibilities (i.e., the government’s compelling interest in getting what 
it is paying for) and ensuring fulfillment of the institutional mission for the 
portion of government for which the employee works (i.e., the 
government’s compelling interest in not having the purpose of its program 
undermined).165 
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore the possible 
application of the framework developed here to these different but related 
contexts where the government has imposed speech-related conditions on 
the receipt of government funding, doing so may in fact help clarify the 
constitutional standards in those areas as well. 
B.  Other Constitutional Contexts 
More broadly, not attempting to develop a grand theory of 
unconstitutional conditions that is applicable to all constitutional rights in 
all situations, but instead focusing on the application of the doctrine to a 
particular constitutional context, and then considering whether that 
application can be incrementally extended, perhaps in a modified form, to 
other contexts may be a viable approach for achieving coherence in the 
unconstitutional conditions area more generally.  Such coherence is 
important, particularly given the calls by some scholars to abandon the 
doctrine completely.166 
It is important to recognize, however, that the framework developed 
for the specific context of speech-related conditions that implicate the First 
Amendment is almost certainly not readily transferrable to other 
constitutional contexts.  For example, as illustrated by the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,167 
the critical issue in the Fifth Amendment takings context is not whether the 
government may generally take private property in exchange for a 
government benefit—it of course can do so as long as it pays just 
compensation and the property is taken for public use.168  Rather, the issue 
is under what circumstances can the government effectively take property 
as a condition for a permit or license without paying just compensation.169  
A completely different approach is therefore likely needed in this 
                                                                                                                          
165 Id. at 2022.  Another possible context is speech-related conditions on tax benefits available to 
individuals or for-profit businesses.  See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 499 (1959) 
(denial of federal income tax deduction for amounts spent for defeat of legislation); Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513, 514–15 (1958) (state property tax exemption for veterans conditioned on taking an oath 
against violent or unlawful overthrow of the state or federal government).  
166 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
167 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
168 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
169 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594–95. 
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constitutional context from the one taken in this Article with respect to the 
First Amendment-protected speech context. 
Similarly, and as illustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,170 the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine also applies in the Tenth Amendment 
context when the federal government places conditions on federal funding 
provided to the states.171  In that context, the key inquiry is whether such a 
condition in effect undermines the constitutionally recognized sovereignty 
of the states, a constitutional structure consideration unique to that 
context.172  Again, this significant constitutional difference likely requires a 
completely different approach to possible unconstitutional conditions than 
either the speech or takings contexts. 
Cass Sunstein suggests such a customized approach, but he argues for 
abandoning the doctrine altogether.173  While I agree that a fully unitary 
approach to the doctrine is misguided given the often significant 
differences between various constitutional contexts as noted above, at least 
in the constitutional context this Article focuses on, it appears that 
considerations of some of the broader themes developed under the 
doctrine, such as whether a given constitutional right is alienable, are 
useful.  I therefore would hesitate to throw out the entire idea of an 
“unconstitutional conditions doctrine,” while still recognizing that the 
doctrine will not apply in the same way in all constitutional contexts. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Given the pervasiveness of government benefits in the nonprofit sector 
and not uncommon attempts by governments to attach speech-related 
strings to such benefits, it is critical that a way be found to clarify the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in this context.  This Article’s 
approach suggests a way that may be possible through careful 
consideration of the doctrine in this particular area.  More specifically, in 
the context of a condition on a government benefit that implicates First 
Amendment protected speech, the questions to ask are whether the right to 
free speech is alienable as to the government and, if it is generally not, 
what the standard is for determining when there are constitutionally 
                                                                                                                          
170 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
171 See id. at 2603–04 (“We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of [federal] 
funds on the States’ complying with restrictions on the use of those funds, because that is the means by 
which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according to its view of the ‘general Welfare.’  
Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be justified on that basis.  
When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent 
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy 
changes.”). 
172 Id. at 2602.   
173 Sunstein, supra note 3, at 608. 
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acceptable exceptions to this conclusion.  With the answers to these 
questions in hand, the situations addressed by the Supreme Court over the 
past several decades, and most recently in the Alliance case, can be readily 
resolved, and lower courts, the government, and private parties will have 
significantly clearer guidance regarding how to resolve future disputes in 
this area.  Moreover, this approach may also be useful in other First 
Amendment situations, such as campaign finance rules tied to government 
benefits and limits on speech by public employees. 
It is important to recognize, however, that the approach taken in this 
Article—determining the alienability with respect to the government of the 
constitutional right at issue and then when exceptions to that initial 
determination are available—likely only works with respect to the 
particular constitutional context considered here.  In other constitutional 
contexts, different questions will likely need to be asked to determine when 
a condition on the provision of a government benefit is unconstitutional 
under the constitutional provision at issue.  The challenge for both judges 
and scholars is therefore to avoid trying to impose greater uniformity with 
respect to the application of the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” than 
as a constitutional matter is appropriate, and also to avoid importation of 
certain aspects of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine from one 
constitutional context to another without consideration of whether such 
importation is again supportable as a constitutional matter. 
